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A Gravity Model of Civic Deviance: Justice, Natural Duties, and Reparative 
Responsibilities1 
 
“[O]ne has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws.” 
— Martin Luther King Jr., Letter from a Birmingham Jail 
What conditions justify a citizen’s deviance from their civic obligations in a 
constitutional democracy? More importantly, whom does the scope of justified civic deviance 
encompass? A common way of justifying uncivil actions is to accept that citizens are only under 
a prima facie duty to obey particular laws (i.e. when incivility poses seriously untoward 
consequences or involves an act that is mala in se) and that they have no such obligation to obey 
all laws.2 When some laws surpass a given threshold of injustice, citizens may be justified in 
disobeying those laws.3 Of this justification, some have argued that all individuals who are 
subject to unjust institutions should be allowed to challenge injustice by shirking their civic 
norms of reciprocity. Others propose that only those who face situations that fall beyond the 
scope of tolerable injustice should be allowed to shirk their civic obligations. So, where should 
the threshold for justified civic deviance be drawn among members bound to a scheme of 
reciprocity and social cooperation? Is there a way to account for the level of injustices suffered 
individually along some sort of tolerability gradient while also extending the scope of justified 
civic deviance to all those within the broader scope of unjust institutions? 
This paper will explain why an approach that selectively permits civic deviance 
(henceforth ‘CD’)—proposed in Tommie Shelby’s “Justice, Deviance, and the Dark Ghetto”—
must be reconsidered.4 It will then offer an alternative structure for consideration. While 
recognizing that the main aim of Shelby’s paper is only to stake out the conceptual grounds for 
these claims and to illustrate that these are conceptual categories worth mining, this response 
centers on the failure of Shelby’s argument to offer details on setting thresholds as to when 
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deviant behavior is justified or at least excused. This paper engages further in that mining 
process and offers an original contribution to the debate by closely re-examining Shelby’s 
threshold account. It introduces what will be called a “gravity model” of CD and the principle of 
reparative responsibilities to permit varying degrees of CD for particular oppressed groups, while 
sustaining permission for all to exercise CD—provided an unjust social structure, and a positive 
difference of natural duties wherein CD-enabling natural duties outweigh CD-restricting natural 
duties. CD-justified will come to mean not CD-forbidden or CD-permissible, and in select cases, 
CD-obligatory. The model is metaphorical in nature and is not meant to be a scientific derivation 
of normative theory. 
This paper is organized as follows: Part I draws upon Shelby’s article, “Justice, Deviance, 
and the Dark Ghetto,” and reviews some of the basic building blocks of CD.5 It shall outline 
Shelby’s Rawlsian justification for CD, reconstruct his application of CD to the “Black ghetto 
underclass” of the United States, and elaborate on the inadequacies of Shelby’s view. When only 
a particular subset of the population is permitted to deviate from their civic obligations, there 
arises an imbalance of burden-sharing. This paper claims that it is unfair for those who do not 
suffer from intolerable injustice—and those who suffer from greater levels of intolerable 
injustice—to continue upholding reciprocity wherewith unjust institutions, especially if 
continuing to do so clashes with their natural duties. 
Part II lays out the elements of what could be a more adequate approach. It begins by 
building upon Shelby’s conception of the natural duty of justice. In this light, one can come to 
understand CD as that which extends to those within the limits of tolerable injustice, and the 
differences in the level of intolerable injustice will be accounted for through the gravity model of 
CD along with the principle of reparative responsibilities (RR). Provided an unjust social 
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structure, all affected individuals are justified in shirking civic obligations although they remain 
bound to natural duties and reparative responsibilities. To conclude, this paper elaborates on the 
guiding conditions of permissible and obligatory CD, drawing from the works of contemporary 
analytical political philosophers, including John Rawls, Robert Nozick, and Candice Delmas. 
Part I: Reflections on “Justice, Deviance, and the Dark Ghetto” 
In “Justice, Deviance, and the Dark Ghetto,” Shelby advances Rawls’s apparatus of 
justice as fairness. Shelby builds his argument from the premise that within a liberal framework, 
justice, at least in part, is rooted in the political value of “reciprocity between persons who regard 
each other as equals,” bound together under a cooperative scheme for mutual advantage.6 
The social, political, and economic institutions of the basic structure of society fix an 
individual’s initial position within society, favoring some individuals in the distribution of 
benefits and burdens—of liberties, duties, opportunities, and material advantages. Given that the 
basic structure bears an immense and wide-ranging influence over an individual’s lifetime 
prospects over which individuals had no choice over, Shelby claims that social arrangements 
should be formed by institutions—for instance, governments, schools, firms, markets, and 
families—as to provide each individual with a “fair chance to flourish.”7 In this grander scheme 
of reciprocity, each participant of the social structure has a legitimate claim to a fair chance not 
to have their lifetime prospects diminished by the social scheme in ways that cannot be justified 
on impartial grounds. 
It is in virtue of this groundwork of reciprocity, known as the principle of fair play, that 
“civic obligations” have normative force. As a beneficiary of the primary goods afforded by the 
cooperative enterprise, each citizen8 is expected to shoulder an obligation to do their share as the 
arrangement requires, such that benefits and costs are divided in an equitable way. Citizens then 
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have a duty to bear a share of the costs that are involved in the production of collective public 
goods. For example, they should pay taxes, obey the law, and so forth. This obligation is owed to 
those with whom one is cooperating in order to maintain a fair basic structure. Each citizen of a 
democratic polity is ipso facto bound to civic obligations as required by the basic institutions. 
When a citizen evades or refuses to fulfill her civic obligations, they attempt to gain from or 
exploit the cooperative labor of others (“free-riding”) without doing their fair share.9 The law-
breaker acquires an unfair advantage over their fellow citizens, and this, in turn, warrants 
punishment to remove this advantage and re-establish a fair distribution of benefits and burdens 
among all members of the society. 
Shelby further claims that an individual’s fair chance to thrive is a necessary condition 
for reciprocity. Each citizen is bound to civic obligations only “when these institutions are just. 
Citizens therefore are modus tollens not obligated to submit to unjust institutions, or at least not 
to institutions that “exceed the limits of tolerable injustice.” Institutions that bring about injustice 
that is so serious as to be intolerable allows special civic permissions for disadvantaged 
individuals, that is, deviance from civic obligations (CD).10 Since those who suffer from 
intolerable injustice have been deprived of their fair share of benefits from the social scheme, 
they are not bound by the civic norms of reciprocity they have as citizens. 
As to determine who falls beyond and beneath the radius of intolerable injustice, Shelby 
proposes the constitutional essentials standard, based on a loose criterion of adequacy. These 
include the basic rights of a liberal democratic regime, such as freedom of speech, conscience, 
assembly and association, political rights and other supplementary rights.11 For all citizens to be 
provided adequate exercise of these rights, Shelby adds, these rights should be impartially and 
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effectively enforced, not merely codified in law, such that all citizens can have confidence that 
their rights will be respected by those with institutional power. 
Consider a society wherein constitutional essentials remain unsecured for certain peoples, 
that is, the social structure deprives certain peoples of their fair share of benefits. Shelby 
contends that in such a society, those affected by intolerable injustice should not be expected to 
fulfill the civic obligations demanded by unjust institutions. This is not to say, however, that 
those affected by intolerable injustice should be released from moral duties altogether. Here, 
Shelby provides a clear distinction between civic obligations required by all proper citizens, 
versus natural duties, which unconditionally bind to all moral persons regardless of their 
associational or institutional ties. Thus, while an individual beyond the limits of tolerable 
injustice may deviate from civic obligations, at no point in time can any person permissibly 
abandon natural duties.12 
One striking natural duty that Shelby highlights is the natural duty of justice. Drawing 
from the Rawlsian project, the two sub-principles of this natural duty are as follows: For each 
individual to 1) uphold and comply with just and efficient institutions when they do exist, and 2) 
support the establishment of just and efficient institutions when they do not yet exist.13 The 
“positive” natural duty of justice provides reason for CD, while its “negative” restatement 
provides reasons for individuals not to deviate from their civic obligations. 
Implementing these concepts into practice, Shelby pictures the plight of the Black 
underclass in the United States.14 Shelby describes a widely assumed narrative about the urban 
poor, wherein residents live in the dark ghetto due to their self-defeating attitudes and malicious 
conduct, and thus violate legitimate expectations for civic reciprocity, including a duty to obey 
the law and support themselves through licit jobs.15 Under such misinformed narratives, when 
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the poor engage in criminal activity (i.e., theft, drug-dealing, prostitution) or refuse to accept 
menial, low-paying, unsatisfying jobs, these actions appears to be “a failure of reciprocity on 
their part”. Such attitudes call for acts of CD to be characterized as irresponsible lawbreaking 
and unenterprising criminality, and for such acts to be rightfully prosecuted and punished. 
Shelby contends that this is the wrong conclusion to draw, however, since the mere 
existence of the “dark ghetto”—with its “combination of social stigma, extreme poverty, racial 
segregation… and shocking incarceration rates”—proves its incompatibility with any meaningful 
form of reciprocity among free and equal citizens. There is sufficient reason to believe that the 
constitutional essentials standard is not currently met in dark ghettos of the United States. Since 
the Black poor live under the rule of institutions that exceeds the limits of tolerable injustice, 
they thereby have a legitimate claim of deviance from civic obligations. That is to say, when the 
poor engage in criminal activity, refuse to accept menial jobs, or bear contempt for society, 
disrespecting the authority of the law qua law, they do not “violate the principle of reciprocity or 
shirk valid civic obligations.”16 
If the social scheme miserably fails to embody the value of reciprocity for a certain group 
of peoples, those who are deprived of their fair share of benefits from social cooperation should 
not be required to reciprocate in civic obligations. There exist no valid civic obligations 
demandable from the victims of intolerable injustice, especially when the unaffected others—
albeit unknowingly—profit from the unjust social structure.17 
Again, even if a society is deeply stained by injustice, moral duties remain owed to one 
another in the form of natural duties. Natural duties, including the duty not to be cruel, to help 
the needy and the vulnerable, not to cause unnecessary suffering, to respect the moral 
personhood of others, to help bring about just institutions, must be satisfied in the enactment of 
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CD. Forms of deviant behavior that are compatible with natural duties, for instance, shoplifting 
and petty theft, may be conceived as permissible. Other extremes of deviance—for instance, 
some forms of gangsterism, which involves the use of “violence, threats, and intimidation, to 
forcibly extract money, goods, and services from others... [maiming] and even [killing]”—
violate natural duties, namely the duty not to be cruel, not to cause unnecessary suffering, to 
show respect for the moral personhood of others, etc., and thus are always morally unjustified for 
all people, regardless of the inequity of a social scheme. On this regard, forms of CD that involve 
mala per se can be ruled out, while still permitting CD acts that involve mala prohibita. 
To briefly recapitulate, Shelby’s discussion brings to light a discussion of fairness and 
political obligations. Shelby’s view is that the empirical facts show that the conditions of 
political obligations do not hold. He proposes that in unfair, oppressive, or unjust social 
structures, individuals are no longer bound to a scheme of reciprocity, while nonetheless having 
natural duties. 
Up to this point, Shelby’s discussion has revolved around the implications of justifiable 
civic deviance for the “ghetto poor,” or those beyond the threshold of intolerable injustice. The 
question now extends to what civic obligations, permissible deviance, and natural duties are to be 
for those within the limits of tolerable injustice, including the benefactors of the unjust social 
regime. 
For individuals not affected by intolerable injustice, Shelby’s understanding of CD 
asserts that they remain bound to the duties of the unjust regime, and they would not be justified 
in shirking their valid civic obligations. With Shelby’s account, such individuals remain bound to 
a cooperative reciprocal scheme to do their fair share as a beneficiary of the primary goods 
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afforded by the social scheme, even if there are those who may not be bound to it (i.e. the ghetto 
poor). 
A hypothetical example can illustrate this point: Imagine a team of laborers—Dongbaek, 
Yongsik, and Jongryul—who sign a contract to work cooperatively under a scheme of mutual 
advantage in a table-lifting business.18 If laborer Dongbaek does not receive a fair share of 
benefits for the work that she performs in lifting an equivalent proportion of the table’s weight, 
and if this were to amount to Shelby’s standard of intolerable injustice, then Dongbaek may 
permissibly deviate from her civic obligations, that is, to drop her end of the table and walk away 
without being subject to moral criticism on this basis. Shelby’s argument continues in the 
implication that Dongbaek’s deviance does not render null the civic obligations (to move the 
table) owed by laborers Yongsik and Jongryul, who remain fairly compensated for lifting the 
table. Since Shelby’s standard of fairness is merely that of adequacy, imagine that Yongsik well-
beyond meets the fairness requirement (i.e. Yongsik receives an attractive bonus on top of his 
standard compensation), whereas Jongryul barely meets the adequacy threshold (i.e. Jongryul is 
provided with minimally adequate wage compensation for his labor).19 Regardless of Yongsik’s 
and Jongryul’s differing proximities from the threshold of tolerable injustice, insofar as they are 
fairly compensated—according to Shelby’s definition, not the Rawlsian standard—as 
beneficiaries of the (unjust) reciprocal scheme, Yongsik and Jongryul, who are not themselves 
affected by intolerable injustice, may not exercise CD. 
There seems to arise an interesting conflict here. Shelby’s initial words on what 
establishes civic obligation is as follows: “[E]ach citizen has an obligation to fulfill the 
requirements of the basic institutions… when these institutions are just.” This implies, in 
converse, that when these institutions are unjust, each citizen bears no obligation to fulfill the 
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civic requirements of the basic institutions. Extending on this suggestion, perhaps the standard of 
appropriate CD should be set at a lower bar, more broadly, such that the mere existence of unjust 
institutions invalidates a baseline of civic obligations for all citizens.20 As to delineating 
precisely what set of civic obligations consists of this threshold is a subject for further study. 
When Yongsik and Jongryul—after Dongbaek’s departure—now must lift heavier weights of the 
table for the same wage, they may decide that this entire table-lifting venture is fundamentally 
exploitative, skewed from the ground up, since the social structure generates enormously unfair 
distributions. In continuing to uphold this scheme along with its unjust institutions, Yongsik and 
Jongryul sustain injustice, perhaps contravening on positive natural duties, notably that of 
justice. All the while, other negative natural duties, such as the duty not to cause unnecessary 
suffering, prevent an extended of abuse of CD for the wrong reasons.21 There is sufficient reason 
to think that those unaffected by intolerable injustice may be permitted to shirk a baseline of 
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On the other side of the spectrum, imagine workers Sangmi and Gyutae, who similar to 
Dongbaek, suffer from Shelby’s conception of intolerable injustice: the lack of constitutional 
essentials. Both Sangmi and Gyutae suffer from great intolerable injustice, falling far beyond 
adequacy conditions. Whereas Sangmi exercises CD, Gyutae does not.23 Here, Dongbaek’s 
exercise of CD, which seems to extend symmetrically for all those affected by intolerable 
injustice, takes advantage of Sangmi and Gyutae (and Yongsik and Jongryul), while Sangmi’s 
exercise of CD gains from the persisting social cooperation of Gyutae (and Yongsik and 
Jongryul). Imagine a case where Dongbaek steals a loaf of bread to eat, having starved for three 
days. Presume that the number of days starved—of one’s and one’s dependents—is the 
dimension by which we measure “unfairness.” If Sangmi also hopes to steal a loaf of bread for 
himself and his entire family who have starved for seven days, but if Dongbaek’s deviance 
necessarily prevents Sangmi from doing so, it seems as if Dongbaek’s CD (indirectly) takes 
advantage of Sangmi, and wrongly so. Both Dongbaek and Sangmi would be taking advantage of 
Gyutae, who, having already completed one excruciating day of work, still has no purchasable 
food from the bakery to feed himself and his family, starving for twelve days.24 Given that 
Gyutae continues to hold onto the table while suffering from greater intolerable injustice—
defined by a more pressing need for constitutional essentials—than compared to Dongbaek and 
Sangmi, it seems that Dongbaek harms the innocent Sangmi and Gyutae, and Sangmi takes 
advantage of Gyutae, and in both cases, the worst off is harmed.25 Thus, a CD permissibility 
condition of proportionality to one’s status of injustice faced appears relevant here. Given an 
initial baseline of permissible CD, it is necessary that an additional permission to CD considers 
the level of intolerable injustice each person suffers as a result of the unjust basic structure, 
establishing a gradient of tolerability. 
10
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Part II: Outlining a More Adequate Approach 
The real puzzle of CD is, then, not how to draw a threshold line for the fairness of 
institutions and for the adequacy of constitutional essentials, but instead, how society should be 
accounting for the level of injustice suffered by individuals while also extending the scope of 
justified CD to all individuals within the broader scope of unjust structures and institutions. 
Hence, this paper proposes a gravity model of justified CD. This model is not intended to 
be taken as a literal, mathematic formula that citizens can employ to meticulously calculate their 
degree of permissible CD. Rather, this model is presented in the spirit of opening up alternative 
ways to think about CD and its implications. The model (first pass), taking into account the 
discussion on burden-sharing (§I.3, supra) is as follows: 
Permissible CD (first pass) = extent of the unfairness of the basic structure (measure of 
unfairness of institutions) • extent of injustice faced (measure of tolerability) 
Figure 2.1 
 
The first equational factor is the baseline concerning the fairness of the rules, laws, 
principles, and institutions that constitute the basic social structure, or the fairness of the basic 
structure itself. Since this first factor is more broadly applicable, Rawls’s more demanding 
standard of justice as fairness could be applied here.26 The second factor refers to the individual 
measure of injustice faced: those who are subject to greater forms of (intolerable) injustice may 
11
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be allowed greater CD permissions. This relation is modeled in Figure 2.1. Both Rawls’s and 
Shelby’s standards of fairness, the FEO and DP versus constitutional essentials, are not mutually 
exclusive, for they may be modeled on the same gradient as follows in Figure 2.2, with steeper 
inclines for each threshold crossing. Other models of fairness could be introduced here (i.e. insert 
dimension-D along the x-axis or add in threshold-T in place of Rawls and Shelby’s standards). In 
Figure 2.2, Rawls’s threshold is positioned to the left of Shelby’s since it is an ideal of justice 
that makes it harder for unjust societies to fulfill: it is more likely for unjust institutions not to 
meet the requisites of Rawls’s standard of justice as FEO and DP (footnote 7, supra) than to 
achieve Shelby’s fairly looser standard of adequacy. 
Figure 2.2 
 
Natural duties, particularly that of justice, also play a significant role as a factor regulating 
CD. The second sub-principle of the natural duty of justice holds that each moral agent has a 
duty—in helping to bring about just rules, laws, principles, and institutions—to fight against unjust 
rules, laws, principles, and institutions, plausibly by means of CD. These CD-enabling (positive) 
natural duties may also be limited by CD-restricting (negative) natural duties, for instance, to not 
be cruel, etc., which impose restrictions on the exercise of CD.  
12
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Considerations of alternative (i.e. legal) forms of resistance to the unjust basic structure 
(i.e. peaceful protests, petitions, authorized public events, and other law-respecting acts of 
solidarity) also fall under the category of CD-restricting natural duties.27 On this basis, 
indiscriminate and unwarranted forms of ex ante violence on the innocent can be restricted. What 
this paper calls the difference of natural duties (ND difference) thus permits CD if and only if the 
CD-enabling factors outweigh the CD-restricting factors; if the natural duty of justice to upturn 
severely unjust structures compels the exercise of CD over all other natural duties.28 If the CD-
restricting factors override the CD-enabling features, then CD may, at the very least, face moral 
limits. If the CD-restricting factors are so great as to cancel out the extent of the unfairness of the 
basic structure and the extent of intolerable injustice faced, then CD may not be justified.29 
At this point, there arises another relevant concern on whether or not CD could be, in 
select cases, not only permissible or encouraged but also necessary or required. Building upon 
the brief mention of alternative forms of action (subsumed under ND difference), certain forms 
of CD may be morally necessary to fulfill natural duties when all other alternatives to CD and its 
weak forms have been completely exhausted. When members of the ghetto poor, having 
exhausted all other (i.e. legal) alternatives of securing adequate resources to feed himself and his 
family, decide to steal a morsel of bread from the bakery next door, they may not merely be 
permitted but rather obligated to do so. For if they refuse to steal bread and feed their families, 
they violate the natural duties of self-respect, respect for the moral personhood of others, and 
duty not to cause unnecessary suffering, among others.30 The pressing immediacy of respect and 
preventable suffering for their family outweighs the dues of respect for the bakery-owners. 
Under some circumstances, a failure to exercise CD represents a failure to do one’s own 
part in upholding one’s natural duty of justice: Those who blindly obey, rather than those who 
13
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disobey the law, may be accused of perpetuating and sustaining vehement forms of injustice, and 
be accused of free-riding on their fellow citizens’ cooperative moral efforts. The need for 
solidarity may call upon CD not merely as a supererogatory act but rather as an obligation: when 
Gyutae, for instance, fails to exercise CD—which incurs on his, others’, and their shared natural 
duties—he might be contravening valid CD obligations. 
By invoking familiar normative categories, one may formulate “CD-justified” in the 
following forms: CD-permissible or not CD-forbidden, and CD-obligatory. At the very least, 
provided an unjust social structure with its set of unjust institutions and so forth, one necessarily 
has CD-permissible—though to varying degrees depending on the gravity model equation—and 
not CD-forbidden.31 In select cases, determinable by when a neglect of CD seriously contravenes 
on ND, we may have CD-obligatory.32 
This model can be even more nuanced by appending an original condition to CD: the 
principle of reparative responsibilities (RR).33 Provided a case of justified CD, not only do 
citizens retain their natural duties (i.e. to respect others’ humanity, etc.) but also come to bear a 
new set of obligations—in varying degrees—to restore or re-establish reciprocity, trust, and civic 
cooperation in the long run. This need not be immediate. Returning to the table-lifting example, 
when a member drops their portion of the table, and when others express solidarity by dropping 
their portion of the table in an act of radical reform, all members are still due respect to another 
as equal moral persons (and perhaps the table-dropping is a vehement expression that this has not 
been the case), and now may be tasked with another duty to work in reallocating the burdens (or 
benefits) so as to provide for a fairer share of benefits (or burdens). In addition, all individuals—
including those who do not eventually engage in CD—now bear the responsibility to amend 
these damaged social bonds, restore justice, and provide closure to affected victims.34 RR 
14
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imposes a duty on all to work towards the adjusting and redrafting of the fundamental social 
conventions so as to reduce unjust laws and practices in a continued process of reflective 
equilibrium. 
In carrying forth the duty of justice, individuals equipped with greater powers and 
benefits (as a result of unjust institutions) should be bound to a correspondingly greater set of RR 
to countermand injustice; individuals (i.e. Yongsik in the table-lifters case) with a greater 
capacity and ability to prevent or counter injustice, in a better situated position to influence 
change, as well as those who are greater beneficiaries of and contributors to injustices, should be 
held to a greater degree of responsibility in amending unjust institutions.35 That said, the 
underlying RR extends also to the victims of intolerable injustice, as they play a part, albeit 
small, in sustaining unjust social structures.36 The ghetto poor, for instance, may not be held to 
the same degree of RR as the uber rich, provided that RR varies depending on an individual’s 
relational status in the social scheme. Since justice as fairness demands an unequal distribution 
of primary goods, RR extends unequally depending on the individual stake in injustice, capacity 
for political sway, beneficiary, and contributory status until at least society is tolerably just. RR, 
like any obligations, compel individuals to take action. Given these additions, the gravity model 
of CD can be revised as follows: 
Justified (Permissible/Obligatory) CD = [extent of the unfairness of the basic structure • 
extent of (intolerable) injustice faced] • [ND difference] in line with [ND • RR]37 
An act of CD is justified if and only if—and to the extent that—the basic structure is 
unjust and the individual faces an extent of intolerable injustice, or CD-enabling factors override 
CD-preventing factors. Acts of CD should be undertaken with natural duties of justice and 
reparative responsibilities in mind, which—to varying degrees—impose the normative 
considerations of respect for humanity and the (eventual) restoration of social cooperation. Acts 
15
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of CD are obligatory, as opposed to merely permissible, provided the exhaustion of non-CD 
alternatives and of the least harmful forms of CD, or when unanimously called for by the natural 
duty of justice. 
Working in tandem, the ND difference and RR ensure that CD does not arise out of 
cathartic or exploitative motivations or aims but rather occurs in line with ND and RR. It is 
important to note that in the equation of justified CD, concerns surrounding political 
effectiveness or pragmatism are precluded.38 Similar to Rawls’s reasoning, the effectiveness of 
CD does not establish the right of deviance, but once that right is independently established, CD 
should be shouldered with political effectiveness in mind.39 As Shelby declares, if street capital 
is to be converted into “political capital in a resistance movement,” the oppressed should, 
whenever possible, publicly register dissent. 
The justification of CD provides an inquiry into the nature of justice, civic obligations, 
natural duties, and reparative responsibilities. This gravity model of CD provides a different way 
of thinking about questions of civic and moral agency, and the duties that individuals should 
carry depending on the justness of their social structure, alongside the special obligations and 
responsibilities that follow from their unique standing in the basic structure. Members within 
unjust structures who exercise CD with respect to their natural duties and reparative 
responsibilities should not be, echoing Shelby’s words, “demonized, stigmatized, or otherwise 
dehumanized, just as surely as they should not be romanticized.” The goal is, after all, to shape 
meaningful bonds of solidarity, to build meaningful political alliances, and to invite the joint 








1 I would like to thank my professors, teaching fellows, Pi Gamma Mu’s ISSR editorial team, 
and all the participants at the Mid-Atlantic Philosophy Conference at John Hopkins University in 
April 2019 for comments and discussion. In particular, I would like to thank my professors 
Lucas Stanczyk for introducing me to John Rawls’s political philosophy in first-year fall, and 
Selim Berker for his engaging seminar on Nozick’s Philosophical Explanations in first-year 
spring, which further drew me to the study of philosophy. 
2 The terms “duty” and “obligation” are used interchangeably but see John Rawls, “Legal 
Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play” from Law and Philosophy, 1964. 
3 See M. B. E. Smith, “Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?” The Yale Law 
Journal, vol. 82, no. 5, 1973, pp. 950-976; Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Chapters 7 
and 8. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977). For standard accounts on the 
justification of civil and uncivil disobedience, see Andrew Sabl, “Looking Forward to Justice: 
Rawlsian Civil Disobedience and its Non-Rawlsian Lessons.” The Journal of Political 
Philosophy, vol. 9, no. 3, 2001, pp. 307-330; Kimberley Brownlee, Conscience and Conviction: 
The Case for Civil Disobedience. (Oxford University Press, 2012); Ten-Herng Lai, “Justifying 
Uncivil Disobedience.” Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, vol. 5, 2019, pp. 90-114. 
4 Tommie Shelby, “Justice, Deviance, and the Dark Ghetto.” Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 
35, no. 2, 2007, pp. 126–160.  
5 Shelby is careful to use the term “deviance.” Shelby notes that he intends to use “deviant” and 
its cognates in an impartial, literal sense as to describe “what is sharply divergent from widely 
accepted norms” (p. 128). Recent literature, however, (for instance, Lai 2019) has reclaimed the 
term “incivility” or “uncivil.” For the sake of consistency, this paper utilizes Shelby’s word 
“deviance,” but the term does not intend to bear a negative or aberrant connotation. 
6 The notion that reciprocity is fundamental to social cooperation has a long history within social 
contract theories. Generally speaking, social contracts are a model of justification that shows that 
members of society have reason to comply with the fundamental rules, laws, and institutions of 
that society. See Fred D'Agostino, “Contemporary Approaches to the Social Contract.” Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017. 
7 Shelby takes a thin reading of Rawls, that is, he claims only to rely on relatively weak 
normative principles drawn from Rawls to articulate his argument. Shelby considers Rawls’s 
apparatus as an analytical framework for surveying the priority of justice as fairness and 
reciprocity, and then extrapolates his arguments for permissibly ‘deviant’ behavior. In 
constructing his view, Shelby deliberately precludes the Rawlsian principle of fair equality of 
opportunity (FEO), a principle of justice that requires equal life prospects for all—measured by 
primary social goods—given similar natural talents and motivation. Striving away from Rawls’s 
“most demanding egalitarian claims” (p. 128), Shelby notes that FEO might “set the bar too high 
for tolerable injustice” (p. 149).  
8 It is unclear as to what Shelby’s term ‘citizen’ encompasses. This paper interprets him more 
broadly as to include refugees, undocumented immigrants, DACA recipients, and other 
individuals who (though not ‘citizens’) share stakes in some larger structure of cooperation 
designed for mutual advantage. However, to expand this definition may require a re-working of 
the details assumed in Shelby’s account. 
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9 For more on the principle of fairness and the free-rider problem and the principle of fair play, 
refer to Garrett Cullity, “Moral Free Riding.” Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 24, no. 1, 1995, 
pp. 3-34; Candice Delmas, “Political Resistance: A Matter of Fairness.” Law and Philosophy, 
vol. 33, 2014, pp. 465-488; Avia Pasternak, “Fair Play and Wrongful Benefits.” Journal of 
Moral Philosophy, vol. 14, 2017, pp. 515-534; Piero Moraro, “Punishment, Fair Play and the 
Burdens of Citizenship.” Law and Philosophy, vol. 38, no. 3, 2019, pp. 289-311. 
10 CD differs from traditional accounts of civil disobedience on several levels, though both share 
overlaps. The most notable difference is that civil disobedience is tied to some account of 
obligations one has qua citizenhood, which aims towards the service of society via the reform of 
unjust laws. In CD, one deviates from such civic obligations and need not continue holding onto 
unjust social structures. Civil disobedience is a deliberate, public, collective violation of a law to 
put pressure on authorities to change their policies. Shelby, in some of his work, considers 
whether resistance (“impure dissent”) can be political even if it does not involve a hopeful 
strategy for changing the social order. See Kimberley Brownlee, “Civil Disobedience.” Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2013; cf. Tommie Shelby, “Impure Dissent: Hip Hop and the 
Political Ethics of Marginalized Black Urban Youth” in From Voice to Influence: Understanding 
Citizenship in a Digital Age, edited by Danielle Allen and Jennifer S. Light, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2015), pp. 59-79. 
In her book A Duty to Resist: When Disobedience Should Be Uncivil (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2018), Candice Delmas writes that an act of “uncivil disobedience” can be described as 
covert, evasive, more than minimally destructive, anonymous, or deliberately offensive. This 
cluster concept contrasts from standard accounts of civil disobedience, which are public, 
nonviolent, non-evasive, broadly civil, respectful, principled breaches of the law, and so forth. 
Examples of uncivil disobedience mentioned by Delmas (p. 45) include “coercive strikes, riots, 
guerilla street art, DDoS [distributed-denial-of service] actions, hunger strikes, covert assistance 
to undocumented immigrants, unauthorized whistleblowing, vigilantism, and the strategies 
commonly labeled as direct action, such as eco-sabotage and animal rescue operations.” 
Delmas’s conception of uncivil disobedience can be understood generally as synonymous with 
CD. 
11 These supplementary rights include “the right to vote and run for office; the right to due 
process and judicial fairness—and the political procedures that ensure democratic rule. The 
constitutional essentials also include freedom of movement, free choice of occupation, formal 
justice, and a social minimum that secures the basic material needs of all citizens” (p. 145). This 
standard precludes the Rawlsian FEO and the Difference Principle (DP), see footnote 7. In 
addition to this standard, Shelby includes the material essentials standard, which is that everyone 
should have adequate access to a minimum income sufficient to meet basic needs, with the 
adequate opportunity to develop one’s marketable abilities and to earn an adequate income. 
12  This refers back to Dworkin (1977, p. 191) when he notes that not all legal rights, or even 
Constitutional rights, represent moral rights (or natural duties) that citizens have or ought to 
have. Though the constitutional system adds to the protection of such moral rights, the law falls 
far short of establishing what they precisely are. Dworkin characterizes natural duties as owed to 
God and to conscience (1977, p. 186). Sabl expands the possible grounds of such duties as 
“religion, natural law, Kantian deontology, aristocratic virtue” (2001, p. 309). For more on 
natural duties, refer to David Lyons, “Moral Judgment, Historical Reality, and Civil 
Disobedience” Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 27, no. 1, 1998, pp. 31-49. 
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13 For more on the Rawlsian project, see Rawls 1999; David Lyons “The Natural Duty of 
Justice” in A Rawls Lexicon. (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
14 In his article, Shelby focuses specifically on predominantly Black urban neighborhoods with a 
high concentration of poverty because “they figure most prominently in the public imagination 
as enclaves of the pathological underclass” (p. 135). The CD established here, however, extends 
to all general victims of intolerable injustice. Shelby acknowledges in his footnote 15 that other 
ethnoracial minorities (i.e. Asian enclaves, Latino barrios, Native American reserves, etc.) 
present complications for the questions of justice. 
15 These expectations for civic obligations are based on the scheme of reciprocity. “Each citizen 
reasonably expects other citizens to fulfill their basic obligations as a citizen, to do their fair 
share in sustaining an institutional arrangement that works to everyone’s advantage” (p. 146). 
16 In light of recent events in the United States as of summer 2020, including the killings of 
George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and Ahmaud Arbery, in addition to violent police crackdowns on 
peaceful protesters, it may be suggested that constitutional essentials have not been met in places 
beyond the “Black ghettos.” See my interview with George Yancy in Truthout, July 18, 2020. 
<https://truthout.org/articles/george-yancy-to-be-black-in-the-us-is-to-have-a-knee-against-your-
neck-each-day/>. 
17 Pasternak (2014) notes that as it may happen a beneficiary may not have known and could not 
have reasonably been expected to know that a benefit is sourced in wrongdoing. However, once 
they become aware of the source of the benefit, they “have a duty”, Pasternak notes, to “transfer 
compensation to the victims” (p. 519). 
18 The names of these characters are derived from a popular South Korean television series, 
When the Camellia Blooms. 
19 What is important to note in this overall example is the unfair distribution of benefits in 
relation to burdens. When burdens are unevenly distributed, differences in wages may be 
consistent with a fair scheme. For instance, imagine that Yongsik carries a heavier portion of the 
table and is therefore rewarded with more wages than the others due to his work. This is 
consistent with a fair scheme. However, when Yongsik reaps a greater set of benefits provided 
an even distribution of burdens, this is unjust. Flipping the example, when all workers of equal 
powers and capacities are provided with the same wage in a case where some are burdened with 
harder, heavier jobs than others, this might be unjust. 
20 Martin Luther King Jr. speaks to the interrelatedness of all communities in “Letter from a 
Birmingham Jail” (1963). King writes, “Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere. We 
are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny. Whatever 
affects one directly, affects all indirectly.” 
21 If the ghetto poor 1) burn cars or break store windows for amusement, driven by a purposeless, 
irrational and chaotic impulse, or 2) rob banks or establish large drug trafficking channels for 
money, status, and power beyond what meets the adequacy threshold of material and 
constitutional essentials, then they are not justified in doing so, especially if their actions are not 
guided by ends purposed to the eradication of injustice, grounded by ND and RR. For instance, 
opportunistic or exploitative aims violate the natural duty of justice in several ways. This kind of 
deviance 1) is primarily motivated by a goal other than the securement of constitutional 
essentials or the combatting of injustice, driven instead by opportunistic ends, for money, status, 
and power, 2) further sustains current unjust social structures and often creates in place new 
unjust hierarchies and institutions (like that of the criminal gang), and 3) often exploits, or at the 
very least, comes at the expense of others who may likewise suffer from the quagmire of 
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intolerable injustice. At the end of his article, Shelby is clear that such behavior does not come 
within the range of permissible CD: deviant behavior must be appropriately channeled to bring 
about just constitutions. In a more recent article on “Impure Dissent” (see Shelby 2015), he 
mentions a ‘sincerity’ condition. Though some acts of CD are primarily communicative, they 
need not aim to persuade an audience (see Delmas 2018). 
22 If a significant reason why Shelby avoids incorporating the Rawlsian framework of justice as 
fairness into his theory is because the FEO and the DP sets the bar too high as to what consists of 
intolerable injustice, then it seems that a plausible alternative to lowering the bar for what 
constitutes fairness is to lower the bar for what permits a base allowance of CD. 
23 Christopher Wellman argues that CD is often “too costly” of an option for some agents. The 
exercise of some high-stake acts of CD may incur serious risk or harm to individual agents. For 
more, see Christopher Wellman and John Simmons. Is There a Duty to Obey the Law? (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
24 A parallel of the table-lifting business example is that Gyutae and Sangmi hold onto already 
heavy weights of the table without fair compensation for labor. When Dongbaek backs out of the 
venture, they must bear even greater sums and weights. 
25 According to Shelby, a core aspect of resistance to injustice is the notion of “solidarity.” 
Shelby’s argument relies on the notion that resistance to injustice is a group enterprise. If some 
individuals refuse to resist, then perhaps that is not a sufficient reason that undercuts the justified 
exercise of CD by others who are also victims of injustice. On this thought, perhaps it is perverse 
to say that the latter unfairly disadvantage the former. For more on the notion of solidarity and 
fate-sharing, see Michael Zhao “Solidarity, Fate-Sharing, and Community” Philosopher’s 
Imprint, vol. 19, no. 46, 2019, pp. 1-18. Also see the section below on CD-obligations. 
26 For more on the two principles of justice as fairness, the FEO and the DP, see John Rawls, A 
Theory of Justice, rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999). 
27 In reply, CD is often deemed a “last resort” option available only when legal alternatives have 
been employed to no avail. Rawls in “The Justification of Civil Disobedience” (1971) views the 
concept of last resort itself as a condition for civil disobedience, that is, civil disobedience may 
be exercised if and only if all other alternatives have been closed off or already realized. Here, 
instead of making the permissibility of CD a “last resort” option, this paper gives weight to the 
consideration of alternatives as one of many factors subsumed in the ND difference. 
28 The inspiration for this principle comes from W. D. Ross’s theory of prima facie duties, which 
Nozick discusses at length in Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1981). 
29 To get into the nitty-gritty, building off Nozick’s discussion of the complex ethical balancing 
structure in Philosophical Explanations, a further condition can be proposed: If there is an act 
CDB available to the person instead of CDA such that CDB’s CD-features (enabling factors minus 
preventing factors) outweigh CDA’s CD-features, then it is morally impermissible to perform act 
A.  Plausibly, an analogue of this principle is as follows: Even if CDA’s CD-features are such 
that CD-preventing factors override CD-enabling factors (negative ND difference), if every other 
act CDB available to the person is such that the wrongness of CDB’s CD-features outweigh the 
wrongness of CDA’s CD-features, then it is morally permissible to perform act A.  Regarding 
larger courses of action, if some act CDA, where the ND difference is negative, is (a necessary) 
part of a larger course of act CDB or general action A, such that the ND difference becomes 
positive, then it seems that the ND difference being in the negative may not be sufficient for the 
impermissibility of CDA, for CDA may be a necessary part of a larger course of action. 
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30 For more on self-respect, see Bernard R. Boxill, “Self-Respect and Protest.” Philosophy & 
Public Affairs, vol. 6, no. 1, 1976, pp. 58-69. 
31 Some authors have argued that even when society is just, forms of CD might be necessary to 
keep the society in check. Rawls (1999, p. 383), for instance, writes, “A general disposition to 
engage in justified civil disobedience introduces stability into a well-ordered society, or one that 
is nearly just.” I will not take up that argument here. 
32 Delmas (2014, p.466) writes that forms of CD are often considered as a permission or a right, 
rather than as a moral requirement. She clarifies that King’s “Letter from a Birmingham Jail,” for 
instance, is not merely a plea for the license to break an unjust law, but rather an ardent 
declaration of the moral obligation or duty to disobey unjust laws. For more on what she calls the 
radical reform argument and the resistance argument, see Delmas 2014. 
33 In contemporary political debates, the term ‘reparation’ commonly refers to compensation for 
past injustice, specifically racial injustice and even more precisely the legacy of slavery and de 
jure racism. That said, the force of the arguments in this paper refer to the rights and 
responsibilities of living individuals, designed to establish a ‘citizenly’ obligation to address and 
correct the extent of unsecured rights of citizens. 
34 Here, this paper slightly diverges from Shelby’s discussion in “Impure Dissent” (2015) where 
he contends that symbolic impure ‘hip hop’ dissent can be a meaningful mode of public protest 
and resistance to illegitimate authorities, even if it is not always aimed at shaping debate within 
the broader public sphere. Though impure dissent is meaningful as an expression of solidarity 
with the oppressed and as a means of resisting injustice, this paper asserts that CD should aim to 
some RR (that is, restoring social cooperation) in the long run, in as long as there remains the 
viable prospect of reform and social cooperation beyond unjust institutions. That said, RR is not 
a condition that justifies CD; CD should be undertaken with RR in mind. Ideally, ND and RR are 
duties we ought to bear: these duties may be construed as our responsibility to work towards 
reinstating the damaged social bonds of cooperation, and to bear this as a long-term goal in mind. 
Of course, as I mention below, the oppressed may be held to a lesser set of CD-obligations. 
Perhaps merely expressing the occurrence of injustice might be an apt response of the moment. 
In non-ideal scenarios where all hope is lost for meaningful social progress, however, we may 
wonder whether social cooperation is even possible at all. For in such cases, “civic friendship is 
dead long before rioters come to bury it” (p. 66). 
35 For more on this preventative responsibility, refer to Lucas Stanczyk’s 2019 colloquium on 
“Climate Change and the Structure of Intergenerational Justice.” For more discussion on 
structural injustice and political responsibility, see Iris Marion Young, “Responsibility and 
Global Labor Justice.” The Journal of Political Philosophy, vol. 12, no. 1, 2004, pp. 365-388; 
Catherine Lu “Responsibility, Structural Injustice, and Structural Transformation.” Ethics & 
Global Politics, vol. 11, no. 1, 2018, pp. 42-57. 
36 In some cases, victims of injustice may best appreciate the nature and sources of injustice. 
That said, it is unfair to expect such victims to be the sole or predominant engines of practical 
change if that means that those who accrue advantage are under no comparable duty. However, it 
would be false to conclude that victims of injustice are under no normatively demanding duty to 
bring about just institutions, especially if they know best what stands wrong. As well, one must 
be careful here not to reproduce a morally condescending view of the victims of injustice as 
somehow unable to help themselves. It has been pointed out to me that on the other hand, the 
necessity condition may be more pressing. For instance, the most well-off (i.e. the dictator of an 
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unjust state) may not be permitted to exercise CD if they simply could have ordered justice to be 
realized (and RR may compel them to do so). 
37 The bullet sign (•) here intends to show some kind of relation that is yet to be determined. It is 
not meant to be taken in a literal, mathematical sense. 
38 Even if ineffective, CD may be morally justified, if not obligatory—and to the degree that—
the reasons motivating CD (i.e. ND and RR) outweigh CD-negating reasons (see footnote 28). 
Nor need CD be performed in the open public, as non-evasive, non-violent, and so forth (see 
footnote 11). 
39 For more on effectiveness and counterproductivity, see Daniel Statman, “On the Success 
Condition for Legitimate Self‐Defense.” Ethics, vol. 118, no. 4, 2008, pp. 659-686; Amia 
Srinivasan, “The Aptness of Anger.” The Journal of Political Philosophy, vol. 26, no. 2, 2018, 
pp. 123-144. Statman discusses a ‘success condition’ for justified self-defense. Otherwise 
immoral acts are justified under the right to self-defense “only if they actually achieve the 
intended defense from the perceived threat” (p. 123). In contrast, Delmas and Srinivasan hold 
that promoting social change is not the sole purpose of social movements. CD, however 
unproductive, may still be an apt, affective response to injustice. Delmas (2018, p. 67) writes that 
“it is worthwhile for uncivil disobedients to express their indignation at the inauthenticity of the 
public commitment to mutual reciprocity, even if it turns out to be counterproductive to the goal 
of persuading the public.” 
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